Moving on upThis blog is being left as is for archive purposes; new entries will not appear here. Please visit Stubborn Facts, the group blog to which I will be contributing from now on. Federalist Society Student SymposiumMy take's available here for anyone who hadn't seen it already. :) OCILLA, ISPs and Contributory InfringementThis is technically the last post of 2006, rather than the first of 2007, delayed while I got my citations in order.
I wrote an internal memo dissecting a sabre-rattling email from a copyright holder warning that ISPs (like the one I work) for may be subject to legal and equitable liabilities if we don't immediately put the beat down on users that are doing file sharing. We don't like file sharers either, but this email seemed a little too ornery, so I did some research to see what the courts have had to say about contributory infringement, ISPs, and the Title II of DMCA. Since it proved interesting and valuable information, and since there are plenty of other service providers out there who may be nervous about this stuff, I have re-written it in somewhat broader terms for a wider readership. N.b., this is not to be construed as legal advice. It's informational only.
Notice about emailPlease use my gmail account if you want to contact me in the next week or so. Some blithering idiot is using my domain name as a return address for spam e-mail, and since there's nothing I can do to stop him from doing so, I can at least prevent all the bounce messages clogging my inbox. Apropos, I've removed the MX records for the domain, so anything you send to addresses @ simondodd dot org or dot net will bounce until further notice. Seventh Circuit ReviewThere is a new publication out of Chicago-Kent College, the Seventh Circuit Review. For those of us lucky enough to call the Midwest home, this is manna from heaven. You can browse at the foregoing link, or download the complete first issue at this link.
Hat tip: Steve at Eminent Domain. Ma Bell is back on the roadDoJ's antitrust division has given the green light to AT&T to acquire Bell South.
Now, let me see if I get this right. In 1984, Ma Bell was broken up into seven Baby Bells, Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell and US West, because it couldn't survive antitrust scrutiny.
Southwestern Bell changed its name to SBC in 1995, acquired fellow baby bells Pacific Telesis and Ameritech, changed its name to AT&T last year, and now looks certain to acquire Bellsouth. Bell Atlantic bought Nynex in 1997 and GTE (the largest independent telco during Ma Bell's tenure, which had itself also bought the second largest independent, ConTel, in 1994) in 2000, before changing its name to Verizon. U.S. West was, let's put it politely, acquired by Qwest in 2000.
So in point of fact, twenty two years on, the seven Baby Bells spun off from one Ma Bell in '84, plus their two largest independent competitors, have now recombined into three corporations. To be sure, the industry has changed (from one perspective - the one that makes this funny and ironic - this looks like a return to the status quo ante, but the telecommunications market has changed radically in that time, and the antitrust calculation is performed in the context of the market competed in), but I think it's not entirely unfair to say: Elwood - we're getting the band back together! The NSA program and the trial judgeAs anyone who isn't living in a cave will by now know, a district court judge in Michigan has thrown out the NSA's eavesdropping program. You can read the opinion here, and nowhere in its pages will you find the words "border search exception" - which mystifies me, since I can think of a couple of reasons why the court might say it doesn't apply, but absolutely none that justify point-blank ignoring it.
The Volokh Conspiracy's Dale Carpenter explains here why the litigants didn't have standing in the first place (Orin Kerr rolls his eyes at the pedestrian Fourth Amendment "analysis" here), and the blog Legal Fiction - which is sympathetic to the result but apoplectic at the reasoning - has a very good post on this opinion here, explaining why summary judgement prior to discovery is almost always wholly inappropriate and is certainly so here.
Electing JudgesLegal Miscellania links to a story about the ouster of Judge Janavs in California. The essense of the story is that in California, "[m]ost of the state's 1,500 Superior Court judges are appointed by the governor [but] face retention battles [] if someone runs against them"; much shock and horror has attended the defeat in one such retention election of a popular and well-qualified state judge by a bagel shop owner characterized as having "barely practiced law in the last decade."
I am mildly surprised to discover that I have mixed feelings about this. On the one hand, in my view, Judges should not be elected positions - ergo, if I had my way, this situation would never occur. Moreover, the partisan in me can't help but note that Judge Janavs was brought down in a spiteful campaign by a grossly unqualified Democrat whose admitted purpose was to oust a Republican from office (this sort of partisan maneuvering being one of the reasons I frown on making judges an elected position, by the way).
But on the other hand, one cannot but observe that, if you are going to give the people the direct power to elect - and thus, the concomitant power to decline to elect - judges, it seems slightly churlish to complain when the people go and exercise that power. (n1). Something just doesn't sit well with me about the statement that Judge Janavs' defeat "sent a jolt through Los Angeles County legal circles, leading some to question whether the system to select judges needs overhauling." Something about that phrasing seems to imply that those Los Angeles County legal circles are perfectly happy with making judges elected officials selected by the people unless and until the people make a choice they don't actually like: the people made a choice in an election, and that is indicative that the system needs reform? (n2).
In England, judges are appointed by the much-learned legal elite (see Judicial Appointments in England and Wales: Policies and Procedures). To be sure, there is much merit in such a system, but if that (n3) is what "Los Angeles County legal circles" really want, which is certainly the picture that the L.A. Times paints, then they should be honest about it, instead of claiming devotion to the rough-and-tumble of elective politics for as long as (but only for as long as) it legitimzes their own preferences.
To conclude on an unusually self-righteous note, I feel that I've rather earned the right to criticize this result - and I do criticize it - by virtue of having consistently said that electing judges is a mug's game. But anyone who has previously defended the proposition of electing judges must either renounce their previous views, or else forfeit the right to criticize this outcome. If you give the people the choice of their Judges, it seems ludicrous to complain when they make a choice you disapprove of.
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Footnotes
n1. Many years ago, when I was involved in student politics, I used to get very frustrated that students would routinely elect people to the Union Executive who I felt simply weren't the best candidates available (indeed, at the time, I felt that it was not unusual for the least qualified candidate to win). To be fair, only a very, very few of those who did get the nod actually went on to do a bad job; most were, at the very least, capable - and some, in fact, excelled (one in particular did such an outstanding job, I felt it necessary to apologize to her at the end of her term for my uncharitable reaction to her election) - but none-the-less, I don't accept that treading water, or simply not fumbling the ball, gets you a merit badge. For many years, I felt very angry looking back on these events, not least because I always felt that there was so much more that the union could have done for the students, in the right hands. Latterly, though, I have become more sanguine about it, concluding that, in essence, democracy doesn't mean the best person wins, it means the electorate gets the person they deserve. Or as H.L. Mencken more acerbically put it, " democracy is the theory that holds that the common man knows what he needs - and that he deserves to get it, good and hard."
n2. The comparison seems to suggest itself that this is all reminiscent of the recent events on the Hill: after six years of essentially being a lap dog to the White House, suddenly the House leadership becomes the dogs that barked only when their own power and prestige are placed under threat. (And, for better or worse, picking a fight that, in my view, they cannot win).
n3. "That" being a judicial selection scheme wherein the objectively "best" candidate, as determined by their peers in the legal elite, gets their gavel.
So sayeth the WSJ's OpinionJournal. For nearly 25 years, conservative legal thinkers have been building an argument that liberalism transformed the Court into an instrument of national policymaking more appropriate to the nation's legislative institutions...Across these many years conservatives have been creating a structured legal edifice to stand against a liberal trend toward aggrandized federal power that began in the 1930s. Chief Justice William Rehnquist's "New Federalism," which devolves many powers back to the states, was one such example. Harriet Miers may share these reformist views, but her contribution to them is zero. Conservatives are upset because they see this choice as frittering away an opportunity of long-term consequence.
If instead the Senate had been given the chance to confirm someone who had participated in this conservative legal reconstruction and who would describe its tenets in a confirmation hearing, that vote would stand as an institutional validation of those ideas. This would become a conservatism worth aspiring to.
Replacing Justice O'Connor with a recognized judicial conservative--which by definition means risking an occasional nonconservative decision--would have helped restore the Court as the institutional tabernacle of the Constitution. With the Miers nomination the Court remains a political Colosseum. We'll win, but the price is a politics of permanent payback.
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